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FOREWORD
Because Gerald Bailey's lectures, given at Earlham
College soon after the climactic days of the Cubark
crisis in the fall of 1962, were so illuminating to
those privileged to hear them, Earlham College is
now making them available to the reading public.
Gerald Bailey is a distinguished British Quaker who
has served long on the East-West Committee of
h n d o n Yearly Meeting of Friends and has r e p
resented Friends on many occasions as a part of the
non-governmental group at the Assembly of the
United Nations. Gerald Bailey has visited mainland China since the establishment of the Communist government and has been, many times, in
the Soviet Union. He is, perhaps, the most widely
travelled Friend of our generation.

Landrum R. Bolling
President
Earlham College
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Thq lectures reproduced here were delivered

at Ear-

College, Richmond, Indian& ih Novem?
ber 1362. They had been largely prepmed fo*
months earlier but two weeks before-they were' 64
fivered the East-West crisis over Cuba arase and
it was necessary to insert references to these eventg
and their implications. These revisions were ma*
Im the immediate aftermath of the crisis but I have
found no reason to change them materially and, irj
fact,- liave left them substantidly as they werh
spoken. -Itake this opportunity of expressing my
katitude to the President aiid faculty of Earlha6
for the indtation to give these talks in the seriq
bf Lilly Lectures on Religion and Politics and foe
the great pleasure and stimulus I derived from m y
visit.
January, 1963.

G. B*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. The Prophet and the Reconciler

....................

1

Chapter 2. Peaceful Co-Existence .
Hope or
Delusion? .................. ................................... 9
Chapter 3. The Deeper Challenges of Communism ........ 21
Chapter 4. This Side Idolatry
Reflections on the United Nations

............ 29

Chapter 1
THE PROPHET AND THE RECONCILER

I want to think aloud for a short time this morning on
an aspect of the age-long problem of religion and politics,
or, to be more precise, on the interplay of the relative and
the ideal in the field of international politics and international peace-making. And since basically the subject is
as old as politics if not as old as religion, and certainly as
old as the Society of Friends, I shall not attempt to discuss
it at the historical and philosophical levels where I would
have little that is new or pertinent to say. Setting my
sights much more modestly, I propose to relate the question
quite strictly to our present situation and to some of the
predicaments which confront those who desire to make
a reality of their religious confessions and convictions in
the contemporary world. I also want to relate the question
to a debate, if debate is the right word in this case, which
has been going on intermittently over the last year or two
within the Quaker movement in my own country, that is
in the London Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends.
Though the terms are only partially appropriate, the issue
has become crystallized there under the title The Prophet
and the Reconciler, and the essential question it raises is:
what happens to our perfectionist ideals, our absolute and
uncompromising standards when they are brought down
into the dusty, even dirty, arena of politics and.power, of
government and the implications of government; when
they are brought face to face, that is, not with things &
we would have them be but with things as they are? Must
we take our perfectionist ethics, our absolute aims and
ideals into the inevitably relative power situations with
which international politics must deal? And if we do so
take them, should we expect to maintain them unsullied
and uncompromised in the process? Furthermore, can we
set the limits of compromise just where it suits us to set
them? Can we be, as it were, in and out of the political
business of peace-making? Can we be prophet and reconciler at one and the same time?
So far, I must say, the articulate and authoritative
voices in my own Yearly Meeting have given an affirmative
answer to this last question. W. Grigor McClelland, speaking to the Yearly Meeting of 1960 in London, not only rejected any insoluble contradiction between the two roles
but saw them as necessarily and desirably fused in the

spirit and the action of each and every person committed
t o a Christian profession of peace. The prophet, as McClelland defines him, "devotes himself to preaching the unilatera1 abandonment of arms as a moral duty. 4?e is engaged
on a crusade to bring to his fellowmen a consciousness that
war is wrong. He calls them whether as humble citizens
or as national leaders to cast away all arms, come what
may." The reconciler, on the other hand, "devotes himself to working for the establishment of conditions in which
people will feel no need to rely upon arms because they do
not feel threatened. He seeks to relax tensions, to promote
meetings of persons and meetings of minds, to suggest acceptable solutions for divisive problems." "We are tempted
to assert," McClelland continues, "that between these two
extremes, the one claiming to be realist, the other to be
moral, there can be no halfway house that is not the product either of confusion or of opportunism. This is to make
a grave mistake." And a little later concluding his lecture,
he says, "The truth is that we are all called to both vocations, that of the prophet and that of the reconciler, neither
of them as an end in itself but both as a by-product of
Christian inspirations and Christian living."
Delivering under the title Buldihg the Institutions of
Peace, the annual Swarthmore Lecture, prior to the Yearly
Meeting of 1962, yet another colleague of mine, Duncan
Wood, reached, if in somewhat vaguer and more cautious
terms,a not dissimilar conclusion. "The message we .have
to deliver," he said in a concluding chapter, "both to the
world and to the rulers of it has its temporal m d eternal
aspects. Most of the topics that we have considered so
far belong to the realm of time." He was referring here,
let me interpolate, to his own discussion of the problems
and possibilities of the United Nations and of the implications of the East-West and North-South problems. And
he added: "These temporal problems may seem remote from
the historic peace testimony of the Society of Friends
which belongs to the realm of eternity. This is not so. Who
can tell to what extent man's undoubted progress towards
international peace is due to the prophetic message that
such peace is possible? Is it not conceivable that without
the intervention of foolish prophets, the wise world might
now be rushing to destruction like lemmings in a year of
abundance unaware of any alternative destination?" "The
peace testimony," he adds, "will continue to give meaning
and inspiration to our message for today and it loses none of
its validity, if to the uncompromising negative of our re-
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fusal to bear arms, we add a demand for a positive commitment to the international ideal."
There are two assumptions here, incidentally, which
I find unwarranted, namely that only the prophets believe
peace to be possible and that if it was not for the prophets
and the pacifists we should have destroyed ourselves by
this time in global thermo-nuclear war. But the core of
the matter is whether, as I shall ask in a moment, "the
uncompromising negative of the refusal to bear arms7'a symbolic term by the way these days-is, in fact, "compatible with a positive commitment to the international
idea," if this last is to involve more than a vague preference
for internationalism and peace. However, befbre I join
in the discussion myself, let me emphasize that there is
no dispute as to the validity of both the roles of prophet
and of reconciler. Nor is there any question, at least in my
own mind, that the world has need of both, has room and
need of both the prophetic and the reconciling tasks. Either
from a point of detachment outside or maybe from within the arena itself, we can prophetically proclaim the
message of total pacifism - of integral peace - the message as the beloved Canon Sheppard in England used to
define it, not of "peace at any price but love at all costs."
Recognizing with a Quaker statement issued in the year
of the Battle of Trafalgar - in 1805, that is -that "it is an
awful thing to stand forth to the nation as the advocate of
an inviolable peace," we can so stand forth according to the
faith and the vision and the courage we possess;. We can
opt for total military defenselessness for ourselves and our
nation. We can repudiate as an inflexible principle all reliance on military force or military pressure whether for
"deterrence" or for use. We can reject all use of coercive
power in international relations and opt for the exclusive
dependence on non-violent resistance and moral suasion
that total pacifism demands. We can resolutely refuse to
surrender any part or portion of the ideal for which we
stand. We can do this despite the possible consequences,
for ourselves anyway, if we have, I would say, honestly
and fearlessly faced them. "Here stand I," we can say, "I
can do no other."
On the other hand we can equally well and equally
honourably be reconcilers in the sense that the term is here
used. We can busy ourselves, as indeed I have been doing
in the last few weeks in New York, with Duncan Wood's
"temporal problems." We can wrestle with the day-to-daq
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issues in international relations set out in the agendas of
the United Nations. We can seek to harmonize the conflicting aims of nations, to reduce tensions whether between
East and West or' North and South. We can LjOlvolve ourselves in the highly complex questions of applied and
agreed disarmament. We can face, that is to sag: the precise tasks the governments and the statesmen have to face
and share with them in some degree the hopes and fears,
the accommodations and the compromises involved. Aml
hoking objectively at these roles we can not only vindicate and justify both but agree, too, that each has nee&
of the other. "The relativist," says Frederick Tolles ha
his -Ward Lecture Quakerism and Politics, "needs the absolutkt to keep aliveand clear the vision of God while h6
struggles-insomeameatsureto realize it in the City of Earth;
And conversely, the absolutist needs the relativist lest the.
vision remain the-possession of a few only - untranslated
into any degree of reality for the world as a whole."
The roles then, we can a@ee, are c 0 ~ ~ 1 e m e n t a But
r~.
if we choose to be reconcilers, if we choose to concern ourselves with the ,temporal problems,, to spend opr time
energy wrestling.'with -practical inte-ional'
issues. andinvolving ourselves nece's~pilytherefore in, the businesq
of state&ship
and statecraft,' then it eseemsclear to me
we must face the implications of.the choice. We,
must, face,'
fra&cIy, t& nature of government and of politics and,the
responsibilities and limitations- that go .with them. We
must acknoprledge that there are, :in fact, -no short cuts
to the avoidance of w+r and the assurance of peke, that,
there are indeed no simple and clear-cut solutions to manyif
not all, the major international probleqns of our time. I
believe it was Alfred North Whitehead prho said, "In publie.
affairs the simple solutions are invariably the wrong sw
lutions." Indeed we have to recognize that some practical
questions in the international field ar6 simply not solvablewithin given circumstances or within given time. They
are not, in fact, problems at all in the sense that they lmve
discoverable solutions in the mathematical sense. I remember a wise Englishman, Nathaniel Micklem, pointkg
out in an essay on politics and religion that there is na
ready-to-hand solution, for example, of the Arab-Israeli
tension, for it is an estrangement not an intellectual puzzle.
"We may say," he adds, "if we think it useful, that if only
Arabs and Jews would all become Christians or Buddhists
or would acce~tthe ideas and the ideals of Thomas Arnold
of EtugbyP.the&difficulties and dissensions would disappear.

:

So, no doubt they would; but as politicians we must deal
with people who are neither Christians nor Buddhists, and
very rarely wear old school ties."
We have to go further than this, however, I suggest,
and recognize that the responsibility .of individual persons
must not be confused and cannot simply be identified with
the collective responsibility of the nation and of the statesmen who lead it. There can be martyr individuals certaidy
but not a martyr nation - a nation accepting martyrdom
voluntarily, that is, except in the virtually impossible circumstance that all the people or at least a great majority
of them, have freely and fully accepted the implications
of martyrdom and want to endure them. "Nations made
up of unregenerate persons cannot," as Vernon Holloww
put it, "act like a community of love." Or to put it another
way: there may be no insoluble dilemmas for the individual.
There may be no enforced choice of evils, no enforced
choice of the less than ideal for him, since he can claim
that God will always show him a better way t h ~ u g hnot
necessarily an easier one. But the nation is not similarly
placed. It cannot escape the relativity of history nor the
political choices within history, nor can the statesmen accept the responsibility for the consequences of the decisions
they take in its name. Nor, if we move into the realm of
political and practical peace-making can we overlook the
nature of the nation-state system itself which, pending the
realization of a fully-organized world community, is the inescapable framework of international relations in which we
have to operate. We cannot in these circumstances escape
from the considerations of power or the calculations of
power any more than can the state itself or the statesmen.
We cannot just wish the element of power, and therefore of
coercion, out of existence. To do so, or to attempt to do so,
is not to be uncompromised; it is to nullify ourselves in the
very process in which we are engaged.
Now we have had perhaps a graphic, a dramatic illustration of this problem in the events of these last days.
I do not want to involve myself here and now in political
judgements as to the rightness or inevitability of the action
the President of the United States took a short time ago in
respect to the newly discovered build-up of Soviet offensive
military power in Cuba. I think future events, future
history may well confirm that this was an epoch-making
action, a turning-point in history, in which the Soviet
Union and the United States got off, as it were, the collision
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course on which they were travelling and at the same
time made possible, perhaps for the first time, a realistic
and practical and productive approach to a solution of the
issues that divide them. This hope will @, of course,
materialize unless there is a sustained will to make it
materialize on both sides; a sustained readiness to reach
firm and honourable agreements and above all to reduce
and eventually eliminate the - as we have seen - deadly
peril of a nuclear arms race. But the point is that this
reinforcement, as I think it may prove to be, of the hopes
of peace has resulted essentially from the willingness of
the United States -let us be quite blunt about this -to
go not merely up to but beyond the point that might have
loosed a thesmo-nuclear disaster on the world. It was not
enough to go up to the brink with the declared or undeclared intention of withdrawing in face of a threat of counter-force. The bluff, if bluff it was, would have been called.
It was necessary, in brief, to risk war for the sake of peace
and the refusal to do so might well, in the circumstances
as they are, have made war sooner or later inevitable. The
prophet - the integral pacifist - and indeed the reconciler too, can and must insist that the deployment of military power or the threat of war, while it may postpone or
prevent war, cannot of itself or without much else, remove
our perils and guarantee our peace. But he cannot claim
or affirm that in the desperate choices the President had
to make, there was any course open to him that was riskfree, or ideal, or that given the circumstances the choice
made was not, for the President, inescapable and right.
The issue is presented scarcely less acutely if one turns
to the two related purposes in which incidentally both
prophet and reconciler have equal concern - the related
tasks of achieving total national disarmament and establishing some kind of world system of security and peace.
Negotiation of an arms treaty, however prolonged and
difficult, remains the only practical route to a disarmed
world. It involves essentially, however, the maintenance
of an approximate parity of military power between the
parties at all stages of the process from the first reduction
to the final achievement of complete disarmament. Any
substantial unilateral disarmament on the part of any of
the major parties to a disarmament discussion would
destroy in all probability or indefinitely postpone, the
hopes of an agreed and negotiated disarmament treaty.
We can advocate, therefore, or pursue one policy or the
other - total unilateral disarmament or multilateral dis-

armament by agreement. We cannot, I believe, pursue both
policies at the same time. And is there any doubt that the
way to the complete disarmament of the nation-state and
the elimination of the arbitrary exercise of power by the
single nation, is in the pooling of power in the hands of
an acceptable international authority? Can this, too, be
reconciled with the requirements of a total and unequivocal non-reliance upon force - an unswerving and unqualified adherence to the way of love and of peaceful persuasion?
Faced with these questions and the necessity to answer
them, I have come reluctantly and not without much exercise of spirit, to the conclusion that for my part anyway
and in the light of the vision I possess at present, I cannot
claim to be at one and the same time prophet and reconciler
in any adequate and meaningful interpretation of these
terms. I have come to doubt whether, to put it colloquially,
we can have it both ways. It seems to me manifest that once
by our own deliberate choice we have committed our ideals
-our absolutist and perfectionist ideals - to the demands.
&f the political scene, to what Rufus Jones once called "the
tender mercies of a world not yet ripe for them," we cannot
by the same token pretend or insist that they be maintained
unchanged or unimpaired. Once so submitted they become
affected inexorably by the conditions governing political
action and political change in the international sphere unless we are to say, surely indefensibly, that these conditions are for the statesman or for the government, but.
not for us. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that
we cannot. I have reached this conclusion, I repeat, with
not a little travail of spirit, recognizing that the implications are deep and far-reaching and that they face me with
dilemmas hardly less acute than those I claim to have resolved. It is in any case a personal decision which I cannot and would not wish to impose on any who are listening
t o me. Certainly the last thing I would want to do is to
discourage anyone here of assuming the role of the prophet
if he or she has the urge and the determination and the
courage to do so. But I beg you not to minimize the role.
I beg you to recognize that the prophetic role makes tremendous, if not total, claims upon you; that it claims the
obligation to set all human relations, not merely the issue
of peace and war, on the basis of sacrificial love. "It is
not consistent for anyone," said an English Quaker Conference of 1920, "to claim that his Christianity as a way of life
stops him from war unless he is prepared to adjust his

entire We, in its personal aspirations, in its relations with
his fellows, in its pursuit of truth, in its economic and
social bearings, in its political obligations, in its religioUS
fellowships, in its intercourse with God, to the tremendous
demands of God's way."
wThis is indeed a pretentious vocation, perhaps the greatest i d noblest of all. Go to it if you must and can! But
if, on the other h q d , you opt for the role of the reconciler,
if you decide to enter the arena of international political
action, do not, I beg you, be apologetic despite the inensistencies and compromises in which you will be involved.
Do not presume that it will not pr6sent moral challenges
too. Do not presume that the approach based on religious
realism, for which 1q n appealing, makes the task any less
a murd task. In the same l e r e from which I quoted
earlier, M e & k Toll- has this to say of the 18th century
Quaker m k r s of Pennsylv@a: ''In some degree everyone
d thegn had:-me to terms with the world, had compre
m h d the purity of his reggious, testimony ai a Quaker.
&at they had m a t e d i n t& Aplerican wilderness 'a co&-'
monwealth in which civil aqd religious likrty, sociql and
political qquality, domestic and external peace h@ reigpe'd
#a a degree and for a length of tkne une-$iid
i6 the
history of - the Westew world,". If h God's good 'ti?& aqd
withi God's help the recgncilers can create, in the wild@mesi
which is ~ U wo~Ld-$odey,
E
a worldqvide coquhonwealtth iq
which these same valzes a q i conditiopq prevail, they
-.
wilJ.
have I$ttle or q t h i n g for which to apologize,
I
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Chapter 2
THIS SIDE IDOLATRY

Since I shall have a good deal to say in these remarks
about the complaints and criticisms currently levelled
against the United Nations in my own country and in the
United States, I would begin with a simple statement of
my own credo in respect of the world organization. For
me a sufficient justification for the United Nations is the
fact that - to quote the oft-used phrase
if the United
Nations did not exist it would be indispensable to create
it. It is obvious, it seems to me, that we cannot get along
without disaster in the growingly interdependent world
of today without some form of universally-based and universally-composed international organization harmonizing
or attempting to harmonize the actions of all the nations
h d mitigating the conflicts which today could destroy
our world. Leaving aside the positive achievements,of the
United Nations in the social and humanitarian fields
though these, too,'would be sufficient justification for many
of us - it is only necessary to consider what might have
occurred if there had been no United Natidns available to
Step into the anarchic situation in the Congo in the summer of 1960 or in the acutely grave situation which arose:
aver Cuba a short time ago and in some degree still remains,
Writing about the United Nations and its indispensability
some few months ago, the American permanent delegate
ti, the United Nations said: "We cannot undo the world
which science is making over to us. With or without an
mbryonic instrument of international order, ' .the overwhelming need for order remains. It is written into our
conquest of space, our instant communication, our common
neighbourhood of potential atomic death." We were only
too keenly aware of the common neighbourhood of potential atomic death two weeks ago. We are not entitled to
claim that the United Nations alone then saved the peace.
But there is no question that the United Nations played
an invaluable role in focussing the world-wide demand
for a peaceful but honourable solution of the problem, in
helping the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United
States to withdraw from the edge of disaster and at least
opening the way for the peaceful resolution of the points
at issue. Now perhaps with greater conviction and feeling
than ever, we can say: if we had no United Nations it
would be necessary to invent one.
But that does not mean that the United Nations is all
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gain and no loss; that it does not register failures as well
as achievements. It does not mean thatethe United Nations
is above criticism. Above all it does not mean that the
United Nations is guaranteed immortality; that it does not
face dangers that could be mortal to it in &tain circumstances. It could suffer almost as much, I would suspect,
from its avowed friends as from its avowed enemies from those, that is to say, who judging it incapable of error
are blind taits weaknesses and above all to the real problems which confront it. "This side idolatry" is therefore, I
suggest, the right stance for the true supporter of the
United Nations even at this moment when its reputation
is high, and "this side idolatry" will be what I have to say
about it.
The complaints widely expressed against the United
Nations in the countries of the West - notably by Senator
Fulbright in the United States and by Lord Home, the Foreign Secretary, in my own country - can be broadly summarized as follows. The countries and governments newly
acceded to the United Nations -in the main the succession States of Asia and Africa - have, it is alleged,
frequently if not invariably maintained a double-standard
in their attitude to the major powers of East and West.
They have turned a blind eye to Soviet imperialism and to
Communist influence and pressure in general, while maintaining a dangerously extreme and irrational opposition to
the traditional colonial powers (even when these nations
have been hastening to divest themselves of their colonialism and have been doing their utmost in the meantime to
promote economic and political reforms in the areas cancerned). In their obsession with Western colonialism, the
Afro-Asian majority in the United Nations is using its newfound dominance, it i s argued, to intervene recklessly in
every so-called colonial situation, to distract the organization from its major purpose under the Charter of insuring international peace and security. In the process they are
i m p h g the vital role of the United Nations as mediator
and conciliator and generally tending to bring disrepute and
impotence upon the whole organization. Moreover a situation is being created, it is said, in which power is being
divested from responsibility, since by and large the AfroAsian majority is incapable of meeting the growing financial necessities of the United Nations, the burden of which
falls overwhelmingly on the larger states. To this there
has to be added the more substantial, and perhaps more
respectable, apprehension provoked not by the behaviour of

the newer states but by the record of United Nations' intervention in the Congo. This is the apprehension, felt perticularly perhaps in the countries of Western Europe and shared, I imagine, to some extent by all of us -that
the United Nations is being required prematurely to
shoulder responsibilities beyond its resources and in the
process to become involved in tasks which exceed its mandate and imperil its existence.
These are weighty charges and they have to be frankly
faced, however unwarranted or exaggerated we may judge
them to be. But before looking at them it may be useful
to stress the extent of the changes within the United Nations which have given rise to these complaints. There
were 51 founding-states of the United Nations in 1945. By
1950, the figure was only 60 whereas to-day-12
years
later-the tally is 110 member-nations out of, I suppose,
an immediately possible 115 or thereabouts. Most of the
increase of 59 states since 1945 has come in fact since 1955
when the first so-called "package deal" on the admission
of new members went through. And the increase, of course,
is mainly in the representation of the new or newer states
of Asia and Africa. In 1945, of the 51 members of the
United Nations, 36 came from Europe and the Americas North and South - and only 13 came from Africa, the
Middle East and Asia. To-day of the 110 members of the
organization, some 55-that is half - are from the African
or Asian continents. And correspondingly the percentage of
the total membership covered by the Americas and Western
Europe has 'declined from almost 70 per cent in 1945 to
46 per cent to-day, and, of course, that 46 per cent includes
a considerable bloc of Latin-American states.
This change in the composition of the United Nations
over the last seven years appears even more striking if one
makes a comparison between the United Nations and the
old League of Nations. Among the 54 members of the .
League of Nations there were only six that would have been
called Afro-Asian today. The United States did not belong.
The majority was firmly derived from Europe and the
British Commonwealth. All or most of the leading figures
in the League were European - Briand, Streseman, Cecil,
Benes, Politis, Titulesco and the rest. The Assembly was,
in fact, a European body, reflecting preeminently the
cultural experience and traditions of Europe. As H. G.
Nicholas has put it, a trifle cynically: "It was European, it
was Genevan; it was close, even cosy. It was as foreign as
was compatible with being international."

.
I am not ou'ering this as a necessarily derogatory comparison, derogatory that is to the United Nations' as we
know it today. It would be arrogant and absurd to sugg&
that Europe - with or without the Americas. had or hasid
a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue. And onacan say that,
while regretting, as I do, the decline of European influence
in the United Nations. The fact is that the centres of world
influence have been steadily moving since 1922 from
Europe to~theextremities af East and West, or, looked at
mother way, have begun, at least, to move from North to
South and it i s appropriate and inevitable that the United
Nations should reflect these changes. Not only that; the,
W k n i m principle of self-determination which broughk
a n w b p of new sucqemion States into the League of Natiom after the first World War was exdusivelg Europeaa
in it3 app3ication. It was not intended to apply to the cob
Snks m
3 ~ p i r e of
s the then great powers. Tbe dependent
~wntriesof M a and Africa had to wait. for their inde
n&nw .until the &mtb of the Second World War..
one of them is more than 16 years old as an indepenaent entity; many of them are much newer than that+
And sovereignty being what it 19 - and membership of the
United Nations being as it were a hallmark of ,savere&ntg
.it is proper and inevitable that these new succession
States should be in the United Nations and that that body:
-Id..
increasingly reflect their presence and their influence, whether for good or for ill.,

-

r

'

'

.Faced then with this decisive shift in the balance of

. forces @thin the United Nations, and accepting it 'as in*

evitable, what are we to say about its consequences for the
life and future of the organization itself? Is it, in fact, true
that the power now vested in the new succession States which is largely, in fact, a voting power -is being exercised without responsibility or at least with insufficient responsibility in moral and political terms? Is it true that
the a n t i ~ u E o n ~obsessions
t
of the newly-independent
S t a b of Asia and Africa, are rendering them incapable:
of making a baheed and responsible assessment of issues
confronting the United Nations - not least those that inwlve the relationships of the great powers of East and
West? And is it, in fad, correct to say that these reflect
serious and significant weaknesses in the United Nations
which urgently need to be remedied?

There is cpexbin1y some substance in these
and their implicaa~nsfor the future authority as well as

the present usefulness of the United Nations are not to be
under-rated. It is undeniable that in certain situations the
Afro-Asian states, perhaps particularly the new African
states, have at times allowed their obsessive anti-colonialism to distort their judgments and lead them into acts of
discrimination and irresponsibility which must weaken the
constructive influence of the United Nations and could
ultimately therefore threaten their own proper interests
and aspirations. Even if one now forgets their equivocal
attitude over Hungary six years ago, how else can one
characterize
whatever the merits of the Indian case except as discriminatory, the totally uncritical connivance
o f most of the Afro-Asian delegations in the undoubted
breach of the Charter involved in Mr. Nehru's military
attack on Goa? How else can one characterize the attitude
o f the Afro-Asian group in respect of the situation in
Southern Rhodesia at the special General Assembly of last
summer in arbitrarily amending the rules of procedure of
the Assembly and in supporting measures which could only
hinder an agreed and peaceful solution of the problem, if
not positively encourage the risk of violence and bloodshed in yet another African area? Or to take a third example, how else can one characterize the virtually total
indifference on the part of the newer States to the restraints
upon personal and political freedom in Ghana side by side
with vehement and constant repudiation of apartheid in
South Africa? There are other cases and similar instances
which could be cited where some of the newly-independent
States within the United Nations have displayed rather
less than adequate responsibility in discharging their functions within the organization.
It is essential therefore not to ignore these aberrations
nor to minimize their importance. The Afro-Asians, after
all, are rapidly becoming the dominant group in the Assembly; the veto, it is sometimes said, is passing from the
hands of the great powers into their hands and the future
of the organization must depend in a very real sense on
their capacity to exercise their position with discretion and
impartiality. The dangers must not be minimized, therefore,
but they need not be exaggerated either. The outlook may
be more promising in this respect and the record, in fact,
less disturbing than Western critics have been prepared to
allow. Anti-colonialism, as understood in this context is,
we may hope, a dying issue anyway. There will soon be no
colonialism left outside the Communist world. When that
time comes -and it is coming rapidly -the newer States

-

must chastise the former colonial powers,' if they wish to
chastise them at all, with other scorpions. One may hope,
indeed, that then they and their former master? will be able
to confront together the multifarious international problems that lie on the other side of colonialism; beyond that
is the liquidation of the last remnants of the old European
empires.
Meanwhile, whatever their aberrations, the newer
States are entitled to more credit than they are often given
for their actual achievements within the United Nations.
Without their assistance it would, in fact, have been impossible in the grave crisis that followed the death of Mr.
Hammarskjold, to defeat the Soviet attempt to put an
end to all independent executive action by the United Nations and to secure at least for the time being the appointment of an acting Secretary-General with no diminution of
hisauthority. Lefttothemselves,thegreatpowersofEast
and West could not have resolved this deadlock. The continuance of an independent, responsible Secretariat was
made possible because the great majority of the United
Nations, including virtually all the new Asian and African
States, would not go along with "an emasculated organization." And even on the specific issue of colonialism, as
many commentators have pointed out, no charge of universal irresponsibility can properly be laid against the new
States. More often than not in the last twelve months when
colonial issues have arisen -in the debates, for example,
on the resolution calling for a rapid end to colonialism,
on the proposal to expel South Africa from the organization,
on Cuba's earlier charges against the United States, on the
virtual Soviet demand for out-and out-war against Katanga
- on all these questions, the votes and influence of the
majority of the new States were thrown against extreme
proposals coming from the Soviet bloc or elsewhere and in
favour of the more moderate resolutions which were invariably and overwhelmingly adopted.
In the light of this over-all record of the newly independent States within the United Nations, we are perhaps
entitled to regard the immoderate attitudes and actions
into which on occasion their anti-colonialism has led them,
as transient phenomena likely to end with the liquidation
of Western colonialism and with the increasing experience
and maturity of the new states themselves. The process
will take time but it will not necessarily be prolonged and
the outcome seems certain. It may well emerge in a better
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United Nations than one dominated and deadlocked by the
unqualified conflict of the great powers.
Less predictable, perhaps, is the outcome of the controversy that has arisen, not least in my own country, over
United Nations' actions in the Congo and the implicit question of the peace-keeping role of the organization in the
future. Here I am not concerned, of course, with the
extreme dissent of a Soviet Government which found its
own freedom of action severely curtailed by United Nations'
intervention in the Congo nor with the more sophisticated
and subtle opposition of groups, in Britain and in Belgium
in particular, fearful of the effects of United Nations policies on their economic and financial interests in the Congo.
My concern is rather with the questions raised by avowed
friends of the United Nations broadly in agreement with
its necessary interventions in the Congo situation. These
reflect serious doubts as to aspects of United Nations policy
and action in the Congo and fears, in particular, of the
organization being involved in this and similar situations
maybe in the future, beyond its available power and authority.
These again are legitimate apprehensions and they
have to be taken seriously. They were felt most acutely
and properly at the time of the open clash between the
United Nations forces and the Katanganese army, in and
around Elizabethville, in September, 1961. They have been
renewed and reinforced from time to time when it has
seemed that the United Nations' forces were being drawn
despite resolutions to the contrary, beyond the responsibility of restoring public order and preventing civil war,
into the implicit, if not explicit, task of imposing a political
settlement in the dispute between the Central Congolese
Government and the Katanga provincial administration.
It is not necessary to reject on pacifist grounds all use of
force by the United Nations to believe that making war
for the sake of peace is an expedient to be used only in the
last resort -particularly by the United Nations. Admittedly, too, the problem of drawing the line between the exercise of a police function and the imposition of a given political settlement has been needlessly complicated by the
confusing instructions at times issued to its representatives
in the field by the Security Council and by the scarcelydisguised desire of some of its members to have the United
Nations impose a given political solution without more
ado. All this is simply an acknowledgement of the fact

that in a situation unique for the United Nations, the action
of the organization has been inevitably experimental and
not without its misjudgments and mistakes. arc
Even so, who would doubt that given the nature of
the Congo crisis in the summer of 1960 it was providential
that the United Nations was at hand to step into the situation? And who would doubt that broadly its intervention
has been helpful and effective? It is true that there is still
some considerable way to go before the aims of the United
Nations in the Congo are fully achieved. Certainly much
more has to be done before the Congo becomes effectively
independent in political and economic terms. But much
also has been achieved towards stabilising the internal
situation. Congolese statesmen are progressively taking
charge of their own affairs, and a large program of internationally-sponsored technical training and assistance 'is
in operation. Given reasonable good fortune the Congo will,
in time, achieve a genuine independence and become a
going economic and political concern.

In any case, however partial the achievements to date
of the United Nations in the Congo may be, we cannot
exaggerate the importance of having available some means
whereby the world community can "intervene in the name
of non-intervention," in situations where the collapse of
one system of power and the weakness of the new incumbent makes the rival interventions of other parties only
too easy and perilous. The points of dissolving power are
after all among the danger-points of our world today and
it is precisely there - at those points - that the contribution of the United Nations is irreplaceable and indispensable. No less indispensable, we can now say in the light of
recent events, is its role in "defusing" explosive situations
between the great powers themselves and making possible
the pursuance of negotiated settlements.
All this seems to me to make abundantly clear that it
is a prime duty and interest of the Governments and peoples
of the West and notably of your country and mine, to make
energetic support of the United Nations a cardinal aim of
international policy. To suggest this is not to propose the
abandonment or the disregard of other aims and loyalties
in the international field whether it is the integrated
Western Europe or the Atlantic Community or American hemispheric collaboration or anything else. These are,
or ought to be, complementary aims - each to the other.
and both to the United Nations - safeguarded, in the case.

.

of the regional organizations, against their divisive implications by being developed within the wider framework of
a universal co-operation. Nor, of course, is it to urge orexpect the Governments of the West, or ourselves, to suspend all critical judgment where the actions of the United
Nations are concerned. It is, rather, to acknowledge that the
supreme interest of the Western powers is to strengthen
the United Nations so as to enable it progressively to take
up on behalf of the international community, the strain of
the new crises inevitably going to be placed on the world
organization in a period of rapid historical change. And it
is to recognise that it is not least the interest and duty of
the Western nations to be unmistakably on the side of the
United Nations because the whole concept of an all-embracing organization - "the property of all but mastered by
none" - and serving the unideological interest of the
eommon man everywhere, is still basically under challenge
from the Communist world.
or
This involves much more from our governments
again from ourselves as individuals - than a benevolent
neutrality towards the United Nations. It is not enough for
the Western great powers
the one-time masters of the
United Nations - to sit on the side-walk, as it were, nursing their hurt pride, lamenting their lost dominance and
saying "Ah! well - the Club is not what it was." If their
lofty declarations of fidelity to the United Nations are to
mean anything they have to develop a dynamic policy towards the organization directed alike to remedying its
weaknesses and utilising more fully its assets and possibilities. They have the obligation to clear their minds as to the
executive functions they desire the United Nations to perform - to determine how much "operational cGpacity"
they are prepared to see it develop - and having reached
these decisions, to put their power and authority behind its
effective action in a given situation without equivocation
and delay. As far as remedying the weaknesses of the
United Nations i s concerned I would say two things: first
to repeat that, as regards the weaknesses due to the immaturity and inexperience of the newer states, time can be
expected to put that right. Second, I would suggest that.
a dynamic policy towards the United Nations would also*
require Western governments to be less apathetic than
they have been towards the obvious anomalies in the United
Nations today and the fact that little or no attempt has
yet been made to adapt the status quo at the United Nations
itself to the new balance of power. This is not, of course,
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to suggest the Charter revision which is excluded by the

impossibility of securing great power agreement. But it
is to suggest that something might be done - short of
treaty-made, structural adjustments - to b r a g the makeup of the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council
and the rest more into harmony with the facts of international life and more representative of a United Nations
wbich has doubled its membership and in many ways trans€armed its character since 1945.

As for utilising more fully the assets and possibilities
of the United Nations, this leads me to say a few words
finally about the evolution of the organization and the
nature of the responsibilities it can and should undertake
in the future. Here I am still thinking particularly about
the attitude and responsibilities of the Western Governments or the Western great powers. Broadly as it seems
to me, they have to be with Dag Hammarskjold in his rejection of a purely conservative - even minimal - estimate of the future role of the organization. They must
envisage the United Nations as he did, not as "a static
machinery" but as a gromng organism, an evolving institution, developing slowly but surely something of a supranational status and authority, "a dynamic instrument of
govei-nments" expressing itself in f o w of executive actisn and permeated in all its dealings ana especially in
the demeanour of its Secretariat with a spirit of objectivity
in harmony with the principles laid down in the Charter.
And I imagine that most of us here would favour this concept, too, if only because it at least makes possible the progressive building-up of the framework of world order or
world government which has become essential in the nuclear age if our world is to survive.
Granted the validity of such a concept, it is still
legitimate to ask, without depreciation of Hammarskjold's
immense service to the United Nations, whether, in fact,
his use of the United Nations in the Congo - imposed upon
him largely though it was by the circumstances themselves
- did not dangerously overstrain the capacities of the
organization and incidentally involve an over-concentration
of power in one person and in one place. Certainly for the
future the Western Governments have the duty to recognise
and urge others to recognise, that even a United Nations
accepting the role - to quote U Thant - of "agent and
moderator of historic change," has to fulfill that task within
existing limitations and that to try and take its executive

action too fast and too far may be to imperil its existence
altogether as an all-embracing organization. And one of
the main limitations that has to be recognized is the obvious fact that the Communists are there, as well as the
non-Communists and the non-aligned, and that all three
must continue to be there if the organization is to mitigate the conflicts that divide our world and to stand in reserve at moments of crisis such as we have recently encountered. I have been at the United Nations on and off
since 1950 and I know only too well the price the organization has had to pay in terms of frustrated action by the
presence and the veto of the Communist bloc. Nobody
knows 'precisely what their objectives are in the United
Nations - they may not even know precisely themselves.
They may intend or hope ultimately to supplant it with a
Communist world organization. They may hope, that is,
to capture it and even to kill it as the kind of organization
both the Charter and Hammarskjold envisaged it to be.
But in the meantime they have to operate in it as it is, like
everyone else; and like quite a number of other states which
have from time to time found themselves at odds with the
United Nations, they have decided that it is inconceivable
that they should leave it. They have just now, in fact, been
obliged in regard to Cuba to acknowledge its value and
utilize its services. A year ago, thanks, as I said earlier, to
the attitude of the smaller countries, they were obliged
to accept defeat on the question of the troika -the threeheaded Secretary-General. They have been obliged, too,
t o realise that the smaller countries in the United. Nations
are sick to death of the cold war and of having their constructive aims and purposes constantly bedeviled by it.
It may therefore be true that the prospect of a somewhat more cooperative era in the United Nations is at
hand. Certainly it seems clear to me that we have to make
up our minds whether it is not better on balance, to have
the Communists - the U.S.S.R. in particular - in the
organization. I do not have much doubt that it is. But if
we are going to acknowledge that, then we have to acknowledge, too, that it cannot be a predominantly American
United Nations or a predominantly British United Nations
or even a predominantly Afro-Asian United Nations. There
must be a willingness to give the Eastern bloc countries .
their appropriate strength in the Secretariat and their a p
propriate say in the councils of the organization. This is
the price we pay for a universality which, I think,.is indispensable. It is also the price we pay for the recognition,

.which is forced upon us, that there is no prospect of the
United Nations developing in the foreseeable future into a
real and independent centre of power. ~robebly,it is true
to say, the world becomes less rather than more adapted
to a centralised global control. The United Nations, in
other words, will remain by and large the centre for the
harmonizing by pragmatic means of the activities of nations
on the widest possible basis. This purpose will involve as
much diplomacy as executive action and in this diplomacy
the United Nations cannot and will not succeed unless it
is at least in some measure a common instrument of East
and West.
I would end therefore where I began, emphasizing a
realistic approach to the United Nations, the need to recagnize its limitations, to use it as it is and to base its development on pragmatic rather than visionary grounds. I began with a quotation from Adlai Stevenson; perhaps I
may end with one. "This present U.N." he said, in the
same article from which I quoted earlier, "is just about all
the law and order our anarchic world will swallow today. If we are to advance to higher standards or greater
security we must work on patiently from the spot we have
already reached and not jettison our few working examples
of genuine international action in favour of something more
ideal -which we shall not get -or more innocuous, which
will not meet our needs. What we have is man's first sketch
of the world society he has to create. He can build better
than this - so much is obvious. But will he go on building
at all if we are forever tearing up the foundations? The
experiment of living together as a single, human family
is more likely to grow from precedent to precedent, by
experience and daily work and set-backs and partial successes, than to spring utopian and fully-formed from the
unimaginable collective agreement of world minds. Let
us go on with what we have. Let us improve it whenever
we can. Let us give it the imaginative and creative support
which will allow its authority to grow and its peace-making capacities to be more fully realised."
Perhaps this is a peculiarly relevant moment to recall
these words and to affirm their appeal.

Chapter 3
THE DEEPER CHALLENGES OF COMMUNISM

The objective appraisal of Communism which as
Christians we are required to make must begin with a recognition of the validity, so to speak, of Communism - an
acknowledgment of the things in Communism which
would seem to be true, whether positively or negatively.
First and foremost we can acknowledge as good the impulses and purposes of Communism insofar as these are
directed to the elimination of social evils and in particular to the ending of poverty and exploitation. We can
recognize what John C. Bennett calls "the significance of
its claim to stand for a new order of justice and equality."
We can recognize, too, the value of its emphasis on the
group purpose as a proper reaction to a self-seeking and
self-centred individualism. We can acknowledge and admire the single-mindness with which very often these nurposes are pursued. We can recognize, too, at this level,
and perhaps with some apprehension, the strength of its
appeal to the so-called "backward" peoples and "backward'?
countries, if only as a technique for rapidly overcoming
their timeless poverty and wretchedness.
Secondly, we have to acknowledge the positive achievements of Communism in the social, economic and technologicaI advance of the Soviet Union since 1917, particularly
in the last five to ten years and at least in the beginnings
of a similar advance, since 1950, in mainland China. We
might have to question Soviet estimates of the debt Russian
progress owes to Communism, recalling that Russia's industrial revolution was in fact well under way in 1917. We
certainly have to take into account the tremendous cost in
human misery which both the Soviet and Communist China
revolutions have involved, and judge for ourselves how far
so terrible a price for. progress has been morally justified.
We can recall that Stalin, in the case of Soviet Russia, inflicted almost limitless physical suffering on the Russian
people. We can recognize with Robert Guillain, the distinguished French journalist who knows Communist China
well, that the progress made in China in the last twelve
years has been achieved "at the cost of the substitution of
mental poverty for physical poverty" and of what he calls
"the death of the cultivation'of the mind."
But even so, it has to be acknowledged that there have
been real social and economic gains for the Soviet.people
which have given them rewards and satisfactions, not all

of them strictly economic, unheard of in the past. The
social and economic gains of the revolution to date for the
Chinese people, are much more difficult to estimate, if only
because of the severe natural disasters they have had to
meet in the last three or four years. There a,#e some who
would deny any gains at all. Certainly what has been
gained in China has been achieved at the price of spiritual
and political freedoms which we in the West regard, or
profess to regard, as precious - though admittedly most
Chinese in the past knew little about them anyway. But
China is effectively unified for the first time in generations.
There is no overt civil war. There are no rampaging w a s
lords. The administration at all levels i s surprisingly
honest. Corruption has largely disappeared and gone, too, to
uote G u i W again, are "the smells, the squalor, the rags,
beggars and the W." Economic standards are still
desperately low according to Western criteria, but there
is a measure of price stability and the signiiicance of this
last, of the victory over infiation, can scarcely be exaggerated in view of the experience of the Chinese. There
i s no question moreover that the present government in
China has the people fully behind it in one of its major
purposes, which is to check "the decay of empire," to put
an end to what is called the national humiliation of one
hundred years of domination and penetration by foreign
powers, and to establish an unquestionably independent,
sovereign and great China.
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Thirdly we can acknowledge that, whatever may be
the errors in Cor]nmunisrn, "the lie in Communism," to use
Berdyaev's phrase, there is a truth or at least a hall-truth
in the basic theories of Communism in their stress on the
significance of economic or material factors in the human
situation. If it is true, as we here believe it is, that man
does not live by bread alone, it is no less true that he cannot
live without it. To quote John C. Bennett again: "Without
a minimal economic security, all else - his art, his philosophy, his music, his politics, even his religion becomes impossible." And that, of course, is incidentally a basic Christian premise also. We do not deny as Christians the existence and importance of the material. On the contrary,
perhaps the supreme message of Christianity is that the
material and spiritual are one and indivisible and that
the only fatal thing is to try to divide them. We can acknowledge, in other words, that whatever its limitations, the
economic or materialistic interpretation of history which
is the basis of Marxism has sewed and served usefully to

correct purely idealized conceptions of life and of religion
which have failed to recognize this unity of the material
and the spiritual.
Fourthly and lastly, in the realm of acknowledgments,
we can recognize the validity of much of the Communist
indictment of the professedly Christian and democratic
West in its failure to live up to its own ideas and ideals of
freedom and fraternity. To this, I shall return before I end,
contenting myself here with saying that, if Berdyaev's remark that Communism is "a poison born out of the shortcomings of Christians," i s true in the literal and historical
sense, in terms, that is, of the mid-nineteenth century origins and inspirations of Marxism, it is still only too true
unfortunately in terms of much of the contemporary world,
in terms of the challenges of Communism to our own faithlessness and our own weaknesses today. "The new Communist world," as an ex-China missionary has written, "is
a judgment on our old world."
These acknowledgments require the ~hristianto be
humble and constructive in his approach to Communism.
But they do not entitle him to ignore or underestimate the
issues that separate Communism from Christianity or that
separate for that matter the Communist systems and ways
of life, or to disguise hPm himself and others that at vital
points they are in profound conflict with each other. It i s
necessary, of course, to avoid the easy hypocrisy which
compares Communist practice with Christian theory, with
Christian ideals which are never realized or even seriously
attempted. But if there i s a truth and a lie in CommuniS~#,
we must recognize and acknowledge the lie as frankly as
we accept the truth. We have not to be so filled with tolerance and sentimentality that we cannot distinguish good
from evil, or if you like, relative "goods" from each other.
For if we are so obsessed with self-criticism as to be incapable of perceiving the essential errors of Communism,
we betray our Christian duty for one thing, and for another
we disqualify ourselves for promoting whatever possibilities there are of an ultimate synthesis which takes and
makes the best of both worlds.
What then is the lie in Communism, judged not in
abstract terms but in terms of the nature of the system
and its essential defects and disabilities as seen from a
Christian and Western democratic standpoint - if I may
put these things together without pretending to equate
them? I am not myself inclined to establish the difference

between Christianity and Communism on the acknowledged atheism of Communism. True, the fundamental
error of the central philosophies of CommuniGm i s that
they leave out God. True, too, that this is not simply a
theoretical idolatry with no practical consequences. But
there is so much practical idolatry, too, in the societies of
the West, so much practical atheism, so much effectual
and consistent denial of God by those who profess to acknowledge him, including ourselves, that I would hesitate
to characterize this as the decisive frontier between the
Communists and ourselves. I remember a striking broadcast by Karl Barth in the early stages of the Second World
War in which he said: "Never forget that the godlessness
that crucified Christ was not the theoretical godlessness of
the atheist but the practical godlessness of' the pious." Nor
would I find it easy to establish the distinction between the
two systems in the rejection by Communism of absolute
values. Unfortunately the expediency that subordinate$
means to ends is not an exclusive Communist phenomenon;
as the history of religious persecution shows. And even
today countries professing to accept and respect Cbistiaq
values are prepared, however reluctantly, to inflict on the
pe~plesof other countries the unspeakable horrors of
$h~rmonuclearwar. As long, therefore, as Christians are
ready, with Communists, to justify any measures necessary to ensure .victory or avoid defeat in war: or in revolution, the exclqsive claim to absolute moral ~tandardsis
difficult to sustain.
There are in my own country, and maybe here too;
those who, facing these facts, would go so far as to say
that there is little or nothing to choose between ourselves
and the Communists in the matter of the commission of
evil deeds. All the barbarities of the Communists, they
would say, can be matched by the barbarities of the darkest
periods of early British capitalism and colonialism - of
our Industrial Revolution and empire-building. And again
are we not, they say, alike in both East and West in our
willingness to commit actions, in the last resort, unpred e n t e d in their barbarism and violence? However exact
or inexact these parallels may be, it is useful to have our
consciences stirred, our tendency to self-righteousness disturbed in this way. But those who make this point are
not entitled to overlook the very distinction which enables
them not only to challenge our self-righteousness, but to
protest against the evils committed or proposed to be committed in our name. In the darkest period of the Industrial
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Revolution in Britain, voices were raised in determined
protest against its social consequences. Men and women
laboured devotedly to correct its more flagrant evils. They
roused the public and the private conscience, as indeed clid
Karl Marx himself writing his Communist Manifesto in
1848 in the British Museum. In 1962 other men and women
in my country march from Aldermaston or sit down in
Trafalgar Square, or in this country engage in a vigil outside the White House or the United Nations - all of them
in order to protest against the barbarities implicit in nuclear
war and nuclear war preparation. It was Frenchmen, as
has been pointed out, who denounced what Frenchmen did
in Algeria; it was Americans who put a stop to McCarthy;
it was Englishmen who brought the Black and Tan atrocities in Ireland to an end; and to come nearer to our own
time, it was Englishmen who reversed or helped to reverse
our aberration over Suez in 1956.'
These protests are made today as they were made ten,
forty or one hundred years ago within the framework of
a political system that allows for criticism, disagreement
and dissent, within a society where the public,' and private
conscience, are allowed to exist. That they are not permitted, as yet, to exist under Communism - one only
dissents from or repudiates the excesses of Stalinism when
it is safe and expedient to do so - is,'I suggest, the crux
of tha'difference between a Communist society and a free
society, and an index perhaps of "the root malignancy"
in Conimunism. For the essence of the free society, and
its safeguard, is in the recognition that there are rights
essentially of a moral character - belonging to the human
person that are not to be abrogated or over-ruled by claims
of state. It is this that makes the free society, as distinguishable from the conscience-rej ecting system of totalitarian Communism, indispensable to the Christian. Because without the recognition of conscience - as John
Middleton Murry wrote: "there can be no assurance of
justice, of legality, of toleration or even of decency; there
can be no adequate safeguards against despotism, no moral
as distinct from political protest against anything and ultimately no freedom of the human spirit."
Having said this I would cautiously add that while
this is still the vital difference between the societies of
East and West, the gap between them - at least the gap
between the Soviet Union and the West - is slowly
but perceptibly narrowing. I am not here thinking pri-

marily of the fact that thanks to the rapidly increasing
industrialisation of the Soviet Union, the development
there of a bourgeois technocracy and the emergence of an
educated elite for whom the October Revolaion is hearsay and not actual experience, there is an ever-increasing
approximation, in economic aims and structures if not in
social purpose, between the Soviet Union and the United
States. I have in mind rather the fact that the demand
for greater freedom in moral and spiritual terms, for a
respite from the permanent revolution and its pressures,
is growing in the Soviet Union and at least in a measure,
obliging its rulers to relax their grip on the Soviet people.
The extent of the relaxation has not to be exaggerated.
"The Soviet Union has not yet abandoned," to quote a
symbolic phrase of Raymond Aron's, "the fight against
heretics." It may still be quite a long way from doing so
and a reaction is still possible in the meantime. But at
least a beginning has been made and the first visible steps
towards a greater tolerance taken. Given the absence of
acute international crisis and a growing intercourse at all
levels between the peoples of the West and the peoples
of Russia, the process seems likely to continue and to
develop. It may be pertinent to remind ourselves that
after all the Russians and the Chinese are broadly after
the same things as ourselves. For them, as for us, the declared goals are social equality, the transcendence of class
divisions, the abolition of poverty and insecurity, and "the
emergence of the whole community into the foreground
of political action" - in short, real democracy. It could
be that beneath the many and the real divergencies and
the bitter conflicts of our time, East and West are moving
slowly toward the same ends and a similar society - a
better society than we yet know in either East or West.
My final observation would relate then to the responsibility of Western societies and especially to that of
the Christian individual within them, in face of the Communist challenge. It is to say that, of course,. we do not
defend our essential Western values against the challenge
of Communism by destroying them either in a military or
a non-military conflict with Communism. We cannot win
in the moral encounter with Communism by giving it the
victory in our own hearts - by approximating, that is,
Western aims and methods to Comrnunist aims and Cornmunist methods. We win, if at all, in the non-military encounter with Communism by concentrating not so much
on the errors and the evils of Communism as on the de-

ficiencies and failures of the Western world. We turn our
scrutiny from the Communists to ourselves, recognizing
that we in the West are not quite as moral as we sometimes claim to be nor the Communists quite as immoral
as we sometimes think they are. Above all we try to fill
the vacuum of faith with a renewed faith of our own. Only
too often we seem to be trying to meet the poison in Communism by absorbing it into our own systems, by practising in our own countries and communities the very evils
we denounce in it. If in the proposed defence of prized
liberties against the assaults of Communism, we destroy or
curtail our own freedom of opinion, our own right to speak
and to differ freely like free men, we are well on the way,
in any case, to losing out to Communism. Or if all we seem
concerned about in the West is out-bidding, out-rivalling
Communism in a practical materialism, in creating a paradise of consumer goods, we are doomed and defeated even
before we start; because as Barbara Ward has pointed out,
the materialism (namely Communism) that believes in itself is bound to win out against a materialism like ours that
is apologetic and shame-faced knowing itself to be denying
the very essence of the values for which it professes to
stand. "The trial of soul we face today," said this same
writer recently, "is to out-dream the Communist visionaries,
out-work the Communist fanatics and out-dare the voices
of defeatism and discouragement within our own society.
This is precisely the challenge which Western man again
and again in his millennia1 record, has met and measured
and triumphantly overcome." Let us hope she is right.

Chapter 4
PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE -HOPE OR DELUSION?

I want to discuss with you this evening what we commonly call the East-West problem in its more immediate
aspects, and to do this on the basis of an objective examination of the meaning and the potentialities of what we have
come to know as "peaceful coexistence." Merely to undertake this examination is judged unfriendly by the Communists. The concept of peaceful coexistence has no ambiguities for them and anyone who wants to probe into its
meaning, even if only to understand it better must, as
they see it, be wanting to maintain "the cold war" and to
discourage the prospect of a new era of peace.
Even so, we must not be deterred. After all, it is the
Communists themselves who are not only vigorously promoting the idea of peaceful coexistence but also carefully
prescribing its limits and possibilities. Those to wham it
is offered as a specific. for peaceful relations between East
and West, are not only entitled but required to know what
i t really means or the ultimate confusion and danger may
be worse than the first. How much or how little "peace"
does it entail? Does it mean that if military force is now
a vacuum, the vacuum is to be filled with war of another
kind? Is the Soviet Union simply offering the West substitutes for war aimed, in Max Ascoli's phrase, "at the ending of coexistence in its favour?" Or is it an invitation to
a genuinely peaceful competition in well-being - the wellbeing not only of the peoples of the Soviet Union .and the
West but of-others as well? Does it offer, that is to say,
a basis for a new and constructive relationship between
East and West? And, last but not least, if it is to provide
such a basis, what does it require not only from the East
but from the West in turn?
We shall be in a better position, perhaps, to answer
these questions if we first define our terms and, in particular, if we try to see what peaceful coexistence means io the
Communists themselves. After all both the concept and
the phrase itself are Communist in origin and inspiration.
What does the concept then imply to them? The answer
can be given in summary form in this way.
Future history, according to Marxist theory, is already
determined. The world moves inexorably to a certain goal,
which is the downfall of capitalism and the universalisation
of the Communist system. But Rome was not built in a

.

day. The process will take time; the interim may well be
prolonged. And in the interim the two contrasting and
conflicting systems, Communist and C a p i t a w will exist
simultaneously; that is to say they will co-exist. Sooner
or later, said Lenin and Stalin, there is a strong possibility, if not probability, of military conflict between
them. (Mr. Khrushchev, appreciating the calamitous implications of contemporary war, has abandoned ,the assumption of inevitable military conflict - to which revision of the doctrine we shall return in a moment). But,
the argument continues, the Soviet State and the capitalist
powers cannot merely disengage themselves militarily;
they must have some sort of positive relations with each
other, particularly in a shrinking world, and relations that
are as peaceful as may be. They should develop, therefore,
on the basis of respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of each other's countries and in a spirit of mutual
understanding, as much interchange as possible in the trade
and cultural fields. This, in generalised terms, is the theory
of peaceful co-existence as enunciated by the Communists
themselves.
But, even so, this is not in the Communist view a
policy for all time. Whether war is or is not an inevitable
element in the process, peaceful co-existence remains a
strictly provisional concept. It involves no abandonment,
no modification even, of the ultimate aim which is the total
and final vindication and triumph of Communism. On the
contrary, not the least of the justifications for peaceful coexistence in Communist eyes, is that it makes the realisation of the ultimate aim less risky, and more certain. As
the declaration of the eighty-one Communist Parties after
their Moscow meeting of December, 1960, expressed it:
"Peaceful coexistence of countries with differing social
systems does not mean conciliation of the socialist and
bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it implies intensification of the struggles of the working class, of all the
Communist parties for the triumph of Socialist ideas." In
short, peaceful co-existence is a means to an end, not an end
in itself, and the ends it is destined to serve remain unequivocally and uncompromisingly Communist.
How much peace is there, then, in peaceful co-existence
so defined? Before suggesting an answer to the question
let me follow up for a moment the implications of Mr.
Khrushchev's revision of the doctrine, since this raises the
important dserences that have developed on these issues
within the so-called "camp of Socialism" itself - between

in particular the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China. Here again it must be emphasised, it is not the
formal ends of Communism that are in dispute; the differences relate not so much to ends as to means - the methods
to be used in the building of. Communism and above all
to the timing of the various phases of the process and the
speed at which they can be fulfilled. And the dispute has
many facets. It concerns, where it is a question of the progress towards full Communism of a country already under
Communist rule, the domestic revolutionary strategy of
Communism. Where relations with the uncommitted world,
the emerging countries of Asia and Africa, are involved,
the question is how best to further revolutionary situations
likely to serve ultimate Communist ends in countries that
have newly achieved their political independence or are
on the verge of doing so. The dispute also concerns the
the
question of authority within the Communist world
contest for leadership of the Cornrnunist bloc itself. Where
is the Communist papacy, the Communist Vatican, to be
located? As Edward Crankshaw once put it: "can you
have a Communist Byzantium as well as a Communist
Rome?"
But above all, the differences between Moscow and
Peking in these matters relate to the global strategy of
Communism and its attitude to the non-Communist great
powers of the West. Since, for both Lenin and Stalin, as
we have already noted, a violent struggle between the
Soviet Union and the capitalist powers of the West seemed
virtually inevitable in the longer run, the purpose of peaceful coexistence for them was to gain time to ensure, if possible, that the war would be fought under conditions of
maximum advantage to the Communist side. Mr. Khrushchev in his revision of the doctrine has not, of course,
turned to Quaker pacifism. He has not rejected "wars of
national liberation," that is to say, wars fought by dependent peoples to gain independence (unless, of course,
the peoples happen to be dependent on the Communists
themselves). Nor of course has he rejected the legitimacy
of revolution. But, recognising the all-embracing destructiveness of modern warfare and assuming, too, the dec!ine
of imperialism so-called and the growing strength c~fthe
Socialist camp - a decisive shift, as he sees it, in the world
balance of power - he insists or has insisted to date that
military war between the Communist great powers and
the West must be avoided and that the struggle between
them must be waged by other means. In the article which
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he contributed to Foreign Affairs about the time of his
American visit three years ago, he asked: "Wt then is
the policy of peaceful coexistence? In its simplest expression," he replied, answering his own question, "it signifies the repudiation of war as a means of solving controversial issues." And to this thesis he has given dramatic
confirmation in his withdrawal over Cuba.

This re-writing of Lenin's and Stalin's teaching on
war and peace and the correct attitude for Communism
to adopt towards the "imperialist" powers of the West, is
unacceptable to the People's Republic of China; in fact it
has been constantly and bitterly attacked by Peking. The
Chinese Communist leaders pay lip-service to peaceful coexistence if only to give the appearance of unity with the
Russians on this as on other issues; but they are, in fact,
much more pessimistic than the Russians about making
the transition to Communism peacefully, whether within
a given country or in the world at large. They will admit
that the emergence of a powerful Socialist system has
weakened the power of imperialism so-called but the imperialists, to quote a not very felicitous phrase from the
Chinese military journal Red Flag, "have not laid down
the butcher's knife or abandoned aggression." The
Chinese will admit, too, that if global nuclear war should
break out great sacrifices would be imposed on all the
peoples, but as they see it, it would be imperialism and
not mankind in general that would be annihilated. And
then as another Chinese paper put it: "the victorious
peoples" (that is, one supposes, the Chinese or the Communists in general) "will build a beautiful future for themselves on the debris of a dead imperialism." The Chinese
will agree, further, with the Soviet view that thanks to
Soviet advances in weapon development, the balance of
power has moved to the advantage of the East against the
West. But all this in their view provides the opportunity
and the justification, not for a relaxing of the Communist
attitude to the outside world, but for driving the advantage
home, for a more militant and revolutionary worldwide
Communist posture, not least in the under-developed regions of the world.
By and large, these differences in the Chinese and
Soviet attitudes reflect the relative stages of the two Communist revolutions. The Soviet revolution is forty-five
years old; the Soviet Union has reached economic maturity,
to use the current jargon, or is rapidly doing so. It is de-

termined to preserve its achievements to date from the total
destruction of nuclear war. It can even do with a period of
relaxed international tension, or relative peace - at least
so that the gains of the revolution can be consolidated and
the practical benefits of economic maturity be extended
more widely to the Russian people. The U.S.S.R.
has everything to gain from a switch to economic as against
military competition with the West. Its policy, therefore,
in international affairs, in the political struggle between
East and West, is broadly still one of consolidation. (There
is little doubt, I think, that Mr. Khrushchev's over-riding
purpose in Central Europe is to stabilize the status quo,
and his insistence on rectifying the particular anomaly
that is Berlin only underlines this general purpose of tidying up and confirming the existing situation in Middle
Europe.)
The Chinese revolution, on the other hand, is only
thirteen years old. It is at what is called the stage of "takeoff" in economic development; it is moving into its Stalin
era rather than out of it, like the U.S.S.R. The Chinese
leaders are trying to modernise China in a generation and
for this purpose they need all the external tension there
is, or that can be created, to provide the stimulus necessary
to maintain the drive forward and to obtain the necessary
sacrifices from their people. They can scarcely afford a
period of international tranquillity because their hold on
the Chinese masses depends on convincing them that they
are constantly engaged in a ruthless struggle for survival
against dangerous forces. The major outside enemy American "aggressive imperialism" - must be depicted
much bigger than life-size; the image of a hostile, imperialist
world must be maintained. And it must be admitted that
the People's Republic of China, at least in its own estimation, is a dissatisfied power. It is deprived, as it believes,
of its rightful ownership of Formosa (Taiwan) and of its
rightful title to China's place in the United Nations. Furthermore the massive obstacle, clearly, to the achievement
of these political aims is the United States. No peaceful
coexistence for the Chinese, therefore, if it is to involve
any easing-off in the domestic or the international struggle.
So much for the Chinese end, as it were, of the problem. What are we to say of Western responsibilities in
regard to the Soviet Union and Soviet ideas of coexistence
and co-operation? It has to be said at once that even Mr.
Khrushchev's definition of peaceful coexistence as simply

the continuation of political and ideological struggle without recourse to military war, can hardly be expected to
raise any great enthusiasm in the Western world. It is
possible to welcome the emphasis on the neeBto eliminate
war as a means of resolving East-West differences without
believing that peaceful coexistence even in the current and
preferred Soviet definition, provides a sufficient basis for
a positive cooperation between East and West or promises
anything in the way of genuine peace.

The underlying assumptions of peaceful coexistence as
understood by the Communists are in any case unacceptable
to all but Communists in the West - or perhaps I ought
to say, more cautiously, to all but Communists in Great
Britain. By and large we - the British - do not believe
that the social systems of the world can be divided and
neatly docketed into two types, and two types only, described as socialist and capitalist. We do not see this as
corresponding even to the realities of the situation as it
is and much less to the situation as we hope and expect
it to become. What resemblance has capitalism today to
the laissez-faire of the Victorians - even, dare I say,
capitalism in the United States? On the other side the
very disputes within the Communist world make clear
that even Communists no longer know for sure, or can
agree among themselves, as to what Communism is. Certainly we can say that neither animal is what it was. Nor,
of course, do we believe in Britain or the United States
that sooner or later one system - that is the Communist
system - must necessarily triumph totally over the other
system or over all other systems if there are more than
two. Many of us would not even want to assert, I imagine,
that the Western system - what we call free democracy must necessarily triumph in its present form over Communism as we know it today. We would prefer to regard
both Soviet and Western societies as, in some degree, evolving societies with constantly changing patterns making possible perhaps ultimately, in a new synthesis, a society that
makes the best of both worlds and fashions it into some
thing better than we can yet see in East or West.
But even if we admit, as I think we must, that the
Communists are right in insisting that the ideological struggle or the conflict of ideas is inescapable and will continue
that, to quote Arnold Toynbee, "the competitive propaganda of our ideas and ideals must go on9'-we can still insist that it is all-important to know under what conditions
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the struggle- is waged: F
;; unless --th&*-struggle
-5: fougM

out on -reasonably--fair and equal ,terms, it. must in .fad
negate peace and even peaceful coexistence. It is one thing
to have a straight competition between ways of attaining
ideals and around the merits of the one -or other socfal
system -let the best side win -whieb. is the Cormnu&&?
declared desire. That suits us quite well; it is a very English
approach. But it is quite another thing if the peoples oh
one side -have free access to both -sets of ideas' wht1e the'
peoples on the other have no -such freedom-'at all.
dialogue, that is to say, can scarcely be effective in a world
of the jamming of foreign broadcasts, of restrictions on
access to newspapers and books and information in-general,
and of officially-limited opportunities of personal contact
between peoples. It is another thing, too, if the straight
competition of ideas and of social. philosophies is supplemented and supported not, necessarily, by palpable aggression or interference but by more subtle methods of infiltration and penetration.
'
,

Clearly too any peaceful coexistence worth the name
is not compatible, as we have recently seen, with the plating of offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba - virtually in
the American heartland - since that brought us to the
edge of war. . It clearly is not compatible with Communistinspired violent sabotage of one sixth of the oil production
of Venezuela. But at less spectacular levels, it is not compatible with the Communist-inspired promotion of industrial unrest in Western countries in support of -extreme
economic demands which must have the effect of disrupting or gravely damaging the economic life of the community. It is not compatible moreover with a constant
Soviet denigration of Western countries, a consistent distortion of their aims and policies and a cynical unwillingness even to try to comprehend the significance of their
liberal values and institutions.
I;

A coexistence, then, that has any right to be called
peaceful, cannot be reconciled with any of these things.
Indeed if Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues cannot come
up with a better, more .positive and less ambiguous definition of "peaceful coexistence" than this, it is difficult to
see how the ideological struggle can be carried on peacefully and, above all, how, in the face of the Soviet challenge
the challenge of a revolutionary ideology linked with
massive State power
enough confidence can be engendered between East and West to make any solid, rnutua
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accord possible. There is no reason, after all, why the
Western wotld, whatever its desires and need for peaceful accommodations with the Communist states may be;
should be interested in a coexistence which is a mere
strategy of the Communist revolution
-g temporary
phenomenon, that is, pending the universal victory of Communism. But there is every reason, on the other hand,
why the West should eagerly welcome and actively promote a genuinely peaceful coexistence - even competitive
one -promising an evolving and, one hopes, improving relationship between the two si'des.
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What hopes are there, you may well ask, of the Communists - and I am thinking here of the Soviet Communists primarily - changing their spots in this way and abiding by the conventions of a .manifestly peaceful coexistence
with or without formal rules? The hopes must certainly
not be exaggerated. Habits change slowly in East or West,
and in any case the continuing influence of Marxist dogma
and doctrine on Soviet policies and attitudes and actions,
is-still not to be under-rated or despised. But even so in
the logic of events, in the pragmatism of history as it is
called, the trends I think - despite the unsolved political
tensions and the recurring crises - are in fact, all in the
direction of a more normal, more civilised and more cooperative relationship between at least the Russians and
the West and much has already been achieved in this direction. "Evidence of ideological apathy," as someone has
said, "accumulates on both sides of the Iron Curtain."
Already the pressures of an enforced conformity on the
Russian people - enforced that is by their own rulers have been sensibly relaxed though by no means removed
altogether. Already too, there has been a very considerable
increase over the last five years in cultural contacts, in
personal intercourse at all levels between the Soviet peoples
and the peoples of the West, not least between the peoples
of the United States and Great Britain. Given the absence
of acute international crisis, there is every expectation
that these phenomena will continue and that the processes
both of normalising the life of the Soviet people and of
improving the Soviet's external relations with the Western
world, will go on.
So far, I have been talking about Soviet responsibility
for making peaceful coexistence work
for making it
acceptable to and usable by the West in the interests of a
genuine move towards peace. But, of course, a peaezful
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coexistence which is to serve a genuinely peaceful purpose
is a two-way affair, not simply a responsibility of the Communists themselves. It demands certain attitudes and calls
for certain responsibilities from the Western world as
well. If we in the Western world believe at all in the p a sibility and the necessity of some kind of accommodation
between East and West (which I would say is indispensable
if we are to avoid the ultimate disaster of thermonuclear
war, or to avoid constantly coming to the brink of it),
then we, too, no less than the Communists will be required
to do something more than avoid military war with the
other side. We shall in fact have to abandon, as the Communists will have to abandon, the policy of all possible
hostility short of military conflict. If we want a peaceful
coexistence worthy of the name between East and West,
we must recognise that some things and some actions on
our part are compatible with that purpose and some not.
Admittedly again the difficulties of drawing the line between what is permissible and what is not are considerable,
though the attempt has to be made. Entering a sensitive
area of discussion for me here - for a foreign visitor on
American soil - I turn for a moment to illustrate the
point by reference to policies towards Cuba, making two
observations on this matter. First, it is certainly compatible with peaceful coexistence that the West, and the
United States in particular, should do its best to ensure
that there are no more Cubas in the American hemisphere
- that the infection of Communism does not spread to the
mainland of Latin America, though I am convinced that
ultimately the only effective way to do that is sq to raise
the economic and social standards of the Latin American
Republics so as to make them immune to the penetrative
power of Communism. Of course, I would recognise also
that the United States and the Organization of American
States as a whole, must ensure and continue to ensure
that Cuba is not established as a palpable military threat
to the security of the United States and its neighbours to
the South, and that this has to be embraced by any ideas
of peaceful coexistence that are to be acceptable to the
Western world.
But in the second place it has to be said, I think, that
anything like a genuine peaceful coexistence may require
of the West, and the United States in particular, not only
the rejection of a forcible military attempt to destroy Communism in Cuba, but a virtual acceptance for the time
being of the status quo in Cuba and a return progressively

.to something like honnal diplomatic and economic rela+
-&ns with Cuba, not least on the supposition that this may
well be the best way to lessen the Soviet hold over Cuba
and to win ultimately the politico-ideological s$mggle with
Sbvkt Communism in a Vlitd area of the worn, These are
. v q difficult and controversial questions I -wellknow, and
perhaps, as far as American policy is. involved in them,
outside my competence anyway. But what is unanswerable,
I think, is that if we want, or believe to be necessary, something more than an armed truce between East- and Westif we are to be consistent and honest in demanding from
the-Soviet Union an improved version of their idea of
peaceful coec~istence- we must recognise that this r e
quires certain -renunciationsfrom us too, and certain positive ~bligationsas we&
'

The stress in what I have been saying up to this point
has been on what might be called the negative conditions
of a mutually acceptable peaceful coexistence - on the
things each side must eschew if a reasonable peaceful and
honourable relationship is to be established between East
and West, or at least between the Soviet Union and the
West. I wouId want to go beyond that so as to hint, at
least, at a more positive approach to the problems in the
hope that it may not be impossible to develop peaceful coexistence in time into something like an active cooperation
between the two sides. Recognising what your former
Secretary of State, Christian Herter, once called the fact
of "shared interest in the essentials of human welfare and
everyday life," we should seize every valid opportunity
of expanding the area of co-operation with the Soviet
Union or of turning competition into co-operation, as in
the International Geophysical Year or the development of
Antarctica or in developing the peaceful uses of atomic
exiergy or in the handling 6f the problems of outer space
and in numerous other potential fields. It may be that the
economic field offers hopeful possibilities of developing
and normalising Soviet - Western relations, especially
through the expansion of East-West trade. Perhaps the
most encouraging development of all on the economic side
would be an East-West co-operation in organising and expanding multilateral aid projects to underdeveloped countries through the United Nations or even by direct coowrations -between the U.S.S.R. The u.s.A.. and the
west should go on indicating its readiness for .that even
though Mr. Khrushchev shows no sign at all at present of

a willingness to go so far in peaceful co-operation with the
West.
On the side of cultural relations between the Soviet
Union and the West there has already been a notable and
encouraging development over the last few years, both
in the more general field of tourist exchanges and in the
Proliferation of numerous special unofficial and semiofficial Conferences such as the recent Soviet-American
Conference held at Andover in this country - in which
Russians and Westerners have the opportunity of rubbing
shoulders with each other and of exchanging ideas and
opinions with at least the beginnings of a greater show of
flexibility and understanding.
None of this,it has to be said, will prevent the thermonuclear war coming if other circumshces are to make it
inevitable. None of this give and take of peaceful contact
and developing peaceful cooperation will indeed be pos
sible if we have to endure a series of recurring crises such
as the Cuban crisis, and if we still fail to make any tangible
progress towards political agreements -on the major issues
dividing the two sides and notably in an initial step towards real and agreed disarmament.
No one expects spectacular or rapid progress towards
these ends in any case, even in the aftermath of the respite
recently secured. But at least the outcome of that fateful
week may be that the task of negotiating East-West agreements is tackled with a new realism and with better prospects of success than at any time since the Second World
War ended. I am sure we are more likely to succeed in
these objectives if, in both East and West, we have thought
out more clearly these problems of peaceful coexistence
which I have been discussing, and have faced up frankly
to the central question: how much peace between East
and West do we want - or must we have - and what
price are we prepared and not prepared to pay for it?

Gerald Bailey
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